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ABSTRACT 
A shielded cask is used to transport radioactive materials 
between facilities.  The cask was fabricated with an outer and 
inner shell of hot rolled low carbon steel.  Lead was poured in 
the annular space between the shells to provide radiation 
shielding.  Carbon steel is known to be susceptible to low-
temperature brittle fracture under impact loading.  This paper 
will present the analysis results representing postulated 
transportation accidents during on-site transfers of the cask.
The accident scenarios were based on a series of cask drops 
onto a rigid surface from a height of 6 ft assuming brittle 
failure of the cask shell at subzero temperatures. 
Finite element models of the cask and its contents were 
solved and post processed using ABAQUS software.  Each 
model was examined for failure to contain radioactive 
materials and/or significant loss of radiation shielding. 
Results of these analyses show that the body of the cask 
exhibits considerable ruggedness and will remain largely 
intact after the impact.  There will be deformation of the main 
cask body with localized brittle failure of the cask outer shell 
and components and but no complete penetration of the cask 
shielding.  The cask payload outer waste can will experience 
some permanent plastic deformation in each drop, but will not 
be deformed to the point where it will rupture, thus 
maintaining confinement of the can contents. 
INTRODUCTION
The Materials and Fuels Complex (MFC), located at the 
Idaho National Laboratory (INL), uses a shielded cask for 
intrasite transport of radioactive materials between buildings 
inside the facility.  The facilities operate year around, dictating 
that some transfers take place in the cold Idaho winter.  For 
safety reasons, transfers do not normally occur during extreme 
cold weather; however, an equipment failure could leave the 
cask exposed to subzero temperatures.  Major components of 
the cask were fabricated using carbon steel, which is known to 
be susceptible to brittle fracture under impact loading at low 
temperatures.  This paper demonstrates that brittle fracture 
resulting from a transportation accident will not prevent the 
cask from performing its necessary functions of providing 
radiation shielding to nearby personnel and confinement of the 
radioactive payload inside the outer waste can. 
The cask is essentially two concentric cylinders with a 
center chamber for the payload (see Fig. 1).  See Table 1 for 
cask dimensions and weight.  The outer and inner shells were 
fabricated from hot rolled low carbon steel with lead poured 
into the annular space between the steel shells to provide 
radiation shielding.  Loading and unloading of the cask is 
accomplished using sliding doors at the top and bottom of the 
cask.
2Figure 1.  Shipping cask. 
The doors (Fig. 2) are approximately nine inches thick, 
twenty inches wide and twenty two in. long and are the same 
plate steel/lead construction as the cask.  The doors travel on 
rollers with hand cranked rack and pinion gears to open and 
close them.  Two 1-1/8 in. diameter grade eight bolts pass 
through the front lip of the doors and into the support 
structure below the doors to prevent opening during transit.  
The cask has a two in. thick, fifty two inch square support 
plate about midway up the cask.  This support plate has three 
holes matching the pins on the forklift C-frame fixture to keep 
the cask mounted on the forklift during transit. 
Figure 2.  View of lower door showing bolts and support 
structure. 
Table 1.  Cask Parameters 
Cask Dimension/Weight Value 
Outside Diameter 32-3/4 in. 
Inner Diameter 14-1/2 in. 
Height 106-5/8 in. 
Gross Weight 32,000 lbf  
Outer shell thickness 3/8 in. 
Inner shell thickness 1/4 in. 
Steel plate thickness (unless 
otherwise specified) 3/8 in. 
Typical Lead Infill Thickness 8-1/2 in. 
The cask payload is carried in the center chamber in 
containers nested inside a 304 stainless steel outer waste can 
(outer can).  The confinement function of the cask is provided 
by the outer waste can although the inner containers also 
provide containment. 
Table 2. Waste Can Parameters 
Can Dimension/Weight Value 
Outside Diameter 12-3/4 in. 
Wall thickness 0.078 in. (14 ga.) 
Height 73-3/8 in. 
End plate thickness 1/4 in. 
Gross weight 1500 lbf 
MATERIAL CONSIDERATIONS 
The drawings specify that the cask was fabricated from 
low carbon hot rolled steel.  No further specifications were 
listed for this material.  Therefore it is assumed that the steel is 
a plain low carbon steel with carbon content between 0.05% 
and 0.30%.  Plain carbon and low alloy steels typically have 
body centered cubic (BCC) lattice structures.  BCC are known 
to lose impact resistance with decreasing temperatures and 
have increased risk of brittle failure [1].  Charts of the 
transition temperature of steel as a function of carbon content 
indicate the brittle-ductile transition temperature for 0.11 % 
carbon content plain steel is the range of -50°F, approximately 
0°F for 0.20% carbon and a gradual transition occurring over 
a range of 0 to 200°F for 0.31% carbon.  Flynn [2] indicates 
the transition temperature could be much lower. Without a 
sample of the material, and in the time available, the ductile-
brittle transition temperature could not be exactly determined. 
Therefore the material was conservatively modeled as elastic 
at small strains (up to the yield point) and then assumed to fail 
by brittle fracture.  Material properties are listed in Table 3. 
Lead and austenitic stainless steel are characterized as 
having a face centered cubic (FCC) lattice structures. They do 
not suffer from a loss of impact strength at the low 
3temperatures being considered and are considered ductile. The 
heat generated by the radioactive payload will warm the inner 
carbon steel shell of the cask and therefore it may also be 
considered ductile. 
Table 3. Material Properties 
Material Yield Strength (ksi)
Modulus of 
Elasticity (106
psi)
Low carbon steel 42.0 29.0 
Lead 2.5 2.0 
304 Stainless steel 30.0 28.3 
ACCIDENT SCENARIOS 
The cask is transferred at speeds of 10 mph or less, using 
a large 20 ton forklift with a C-frame to raise the cask clear of 
the ground.  Operating procedures keep the center of gravity 
(cg) of the cask within six feet of the surface.  The travel path 
of the cask traverses asphalt pavement, rock and gravel 
roadways, compacted soil, and the concrete aprons in the 
immediate vicinity of the facility buildings. 
The accident scenarios assume that the cask will fall 
from a height of six feet and impact on concrete.  Three 
orientations were selected to represent the impacts that would 
most severely damage the cask components or the payload in 
the waste can. 
1. Cask in a vertical orientation impacting on the flat 
bottom. 
2. Cask in a tilted orientation impacting on a bottom 
edge with the cask cg over the impacting bottom 
corner.
3. Cask in a horizontal orientation impacting on its 
side.
If the cask is dropped, the horizontal velocity will cause 
the cask to skid along the concrete, asphalt or gravel.  The 
horizontal deceleration would be small compared to the 
vertical deceleration arising from the impact.  This would not 
be true if the cask was dropped near a massive structure that 
would act as a rigid body and rapidly decelerate the cask 
horizontally.  This is not a plausible event considering how 
the cask is transported and the facility layout. As damage 
arising from the decelerations from 10 mph horizontal 
velocity is expected to be relatively minor, they need not be 
included in the analysis. 
None of the accident scenarios examine how well the 
cask resists penetration.  Although not required by site 
conditions, a 40-in side drop onto a 6-in. diameter rigid pin [3] 
at an unreinforced location on the cask was added. 
The cask must provide two functions to satisfactorily 
survive these events.  (1) Since the shielded cask itself is not 
sealed, the outer waste can must undergo the impact without 
tearing or breaching in order to ensure that radioactive 
contents do not escape to the environment.  (2) The cask must 
also maintain its gross geometry well enough to provide 
adequate shielding to nearby personnel and keep the waste can 
captive inside the cask. 
FINITE ELEMENT MODEL 
A finite element model was created of the cask in I-
DEAS 12 NX [4] and translated into an ABAQUS/Explicit [5] 
input file. 
The cask was modeled using brick elements for the lead 
and then coated with shell elements for the inner and outer 
low carbon steel shell elements.  Typical element length is 
about 1.25 in. (Fig. 3).  The doors were modeled using the 
same method.  The density of the lead was increased to bring 
the total weight of the cask (including the outer can) to 16 
tons.  It was also assumed that the lead and steel plates were 
bonded.  This assumption simplified the creation and of the 
finite element model and reduced the solution time.  This 
simplification was judged to have a small influence in the 
outcome of the analysis because the damaged shell elements 
will be removed from the analysis when it would begin to 
make a difference whether they were bonded or not. 
The outer can was modeled with thin shell elements with 
their density increased to account for the weight of the 
contents.  This is conservative in that the stiffness of the 
contents does not add to the strength of the outer can.  Also, 
all the energy will be absorbed by the can and not the 
contents.  However, larger than actual deformation of the 
outer can is expected when using this technique. 
The rack and pinion system used to operate the doors 
was not included in the finite element model. 
Failure of the outer layer of carbon steel was defined in 
the ABAQUS/Explicit model as tensile failure for brittle 
materials.  The cutoff stress was defined as Vy/3 per the 
discussion in the ABAQUS Theory Manual for Isotropic 
Elasto-Plasticity material definition.  This failure theory 
(tensile failure) assumes failure when the pressure stress 
component is higher than the cutoff stress.  This means that 
there is no plastic behavior in this material and when the 
cutoff stress is used, failure occurs when Vy is reached.  This 
model was chosen because it more closely represents the 
brittle behavior of the outer steel shell. 
Welds were included in the model where the baseplate is 
attached to the cask and also where the lifting plate is welded 
to the cask.  These welds are modeled with thin shell elements 
with the shell thickness equal to the fillet weld throat length. 
The 1-1/8 in. door bolts were modeled as circular beams 
with a radius of 0.4928 inches, which is the radius of the 
thread stress area.  These beam elements were monitored 
during the analysis to determine whether or not failure 
occurred.
4ABAQUS/Explicit general contact was used to simplify 
the contact for this analysis. 
The finite element model was impacted on a rigid 
surface with an initial velocity to simulate a drop onto a 
concrete pad from a height of 6 ft. 
ANALYSIS RESULTS 
Flat bottom
The flat bottom drop configuration is shown in Fig. 3.  
Results of this drop show that some of the outer carbon steel 
shell, door support structure, and the bottom plate elements 
will fail and were removed from the model (Fig. 4).  The 
maximum displacement of the lead was 0.415 in.  The outer 
can has a maximum strain of 5.2%, which is much less than 
the allowable of 40% [6] and does not rupture.  The outer 
waste can becomes about 0.394 in. shorter and 0.288 in. 
wider.  The bolts do not fail in this drop.  The displacements 
of various nodes tracked during the impact of the cask are 
shown in Fig. 5. 
Figure 3.  Finite element model of the flat bottom drop. 
Figure 4.  Cutaway view showing the outer carbon steel 
elements removed during the analysis at 10 milliseconds. 
Figure 5.  Vertical displacement of various nodes in the 
model. 
Front Bottom Corner
The cask was tilted in an orientation to impact on the 
front bottom edge with the cask cg over the impacting bottom 
corner and perpendicular to the rigid surface.  Figure 6 shows 
a cutaway view of the cask (without lead) during the front 
bottom corner drop.  The elements that have failed are local to 
the impact region and have been removed during the analysis.  
It is seen that the bottom door is still in place and offers 
shielding, but the door support structure has generally failed.  
This allows the door bolts to go free which would allow the 
door to open if the structure was not distorted in the impact.  
The maximum deformation of the bottom corner of the cask is 
less than two inches (Fig. 7).  The maximum strain in the 
outer can is 1.8%.  Displacement of the specified nodes is 
shown in Fig. 8. 
Figure 6.  Cutaway view showing the front bottom corner 
drop showing elements that have not failed. 
Rigid 
surface
5Figure 7.  Cutaway view showing undamaged steel and 
lead elements.  Maximum deformation is less than 2.0 
inches 
Figure 8.  Displacement of various nodes in the model. 
Side Drop
The cask was dropped horizontally on its side, 
perpendicular to the door support structures.  A horizontal 
front drop would cause the door support structures to deform 
which would not allow the doors to open, but the door support 
structures would also absorb some energy and prolong the 
period of the impact.   This would result in less deceleration 
than a side impact which would provide higher deceleration. 
The first structure to impact the rigid surface will be the 
2 in.-thick support plate in the middle of the cask (Fig. 9).  
This plate will transfer the forces to the outer shell elements 
and subsequently to the underlying lead elements (Fig. 10).  
The maximum strain in the lead is 13% and the maximum 
strain in the outer can is about 3%.  The maximum 
displacement of the lead is about 0.5 in.  Displacements of the 
specified nodes are shown in Fig. 11.  The door bolts do not 
fail during this drop. 
Figure 9.  Cutaway view of the cask at 10 milliseconds 
showing the undamaged outer steel and weld elements 
Figure 10.  Plastic strains in the lead under the lifting plate 
are about 13%.  Note the bowing of the cask. 
Figure 11.  Displacement of the specified nodes. 
Front Post Drop
This drop shows the results of dropping the cask 40 
inches onto a 6-inch diameter rigid post.  The post impacts the 
front of the cask just below the 3/8-in. thick reinforcing belt 
near the lifting plate.  Although not required by site 
conditions, this drop is used to demonstrate the puncture 
resistance of the cask.  Results of this drop are shown in Fig. 
12.  The cask is indented 3.36 in. on the outside and bulges 
upward 1.29 in. in the interior of the cask.  The lead is 2.12 in. 
thinner in the vicinity of the post impact.  The outer can is 
6indented 1.32 in. (Fig. 13).  Displacements of the specified 
nodes are shown in Fig. 14.  The bolts do not fail during this 
drop and the doors stay in place. 
Figure 12.  View of the cask drop on a rigid post.  All 
elements are displayed. 
Figure 13.  Cutaway view showing plastic strain and 
deformation in the outer can. 
Figure 14.  Displacement of the specified nodes. 
CONCLUSION
This series of impact analyses show the results of 
dropping the cask during low-temperature operating 
conditions in different orientations.  The body of the cask 
exhibits considerable ruggedness and will remain largely 
intact after the impact. There will be localized failure of the 
door support structures and deformation of the main cask 
body but no complete breach of the cask body lead shielding. 
This drop analysis shows that: 
1. The outer waste can will experience some permanent 
plastic deformation in each drop, but will not be 
deformed to the point where it will rupture.  The can 
will maintain confinement of its contents. 
2. The post impact will cause the most lead thinning.  In 
the region of the impact the lead will become 
approximately 2.12 inches thinner.  The bottom 
corner drops will decrease the thickness of the lead in 
the vicinity of the impact, but this lead acts as 
secondary shielding while the bottom door lead acts 
as the primary shielding. 
3. The doors stay in place except for the front bottom 
drop where the door support structure fails. In this 
event, the shield doors may open far enough to 
partially expose the cask interior payload to the 
environment. However, the distortion of the 
remaining door support structures and the remains of 
the rack and pinion drive make it unlikely that neither 
door will completely escape its mounting which will 
keep the outer waste can contained within the body 
of the cask. 
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